Tag Archives: CIA

Torture unlawful and unhelpful: ACLU

 

Dmitry Borshch, Waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah (Ink on paper, 24 x 28 inches, 2010)

Dmitry Borshch, Waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah (ink on paper, 24 x 28 inches, 2010)

Marcellene Hearn, American Civil Liberties Union 
December, 2014

One of the most important takeaways from America’s Senate Intelligence Committee’s torture report summary is that senior Central Intelligence Agency personnel — which the report refers to as CIA headquarters — knew from the very beginning that torture was unlawful and learned quickly that their brutal program was pointless.

Yet they told the interrogators to keep torturing.

In November, 2001, before the CIA had a single prisoner in its custody, its lawyers began researching potential legal defences to torture.

In July, 2002 its lawyers drafted a letter to the justice department seeking advance immunity from prosecution under the U.S. law that bans torture. 

The letter was never sent, but as John Sifton of Human Rights Watch has noted, it’s clear evidence that the CIA knew what it wanted to do was unlawful, and did it anyway.

Abu Zubaydah was the first victim of the CIA’s torture techniques.

Just days after his torture regimen began, in August, 2002, CIA personnel sent cables back to CIA Headquarters, in which they repeatedly said they thought it “highly unlikely” that Abu Zubaydah had the information headquarters sought.

Superiors at Langley told them to keep going.

CIA interrogators reported waterboarding sessions that left Abu Zubaydah “completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” (A CIA email in August, 2002 said that even watching videos of the torture produced in the viewer “strong feelings of futility (and legality) [sic] of escalating or even maintaining the pressure.”)

Headquarters instructed the interrogators to keep going.

Abu Zubaydah would be subjected to the torture techniques for 20 days straight. He spent the equivalent of more than 11 days in a coffin-shaped box and was waterboarded 93 times. According to the Senate report, Zubaydah did not supply the information Langley said it wanted from the torture.

Yet the program was declared a success and expanded.

By early 2003, the CIA was making plans that called for detainees to be tortured basically upon arrival at a given CIA detention site.

For example, when the CIA decided to render Ramzi Bin al Shibh to its prison in Poland in February 2003, interrogators prepared for his arrival by drafting an interrogation plan that called for him to be shaved, stripped, and shackled “hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head” in a cold room – all before interrogators even met him and determined whether he was “cooperative,” to use the report’s term.

The author, Marcellene Hearn, is a lawyer whose ACLU assignment is the management of legal and policy challenges to torture and unlawful detention.

Marcellene Hearn is a lawyer whose ACLU assignment is management of legal and policy challenges to torture and unlawful detention.

Bin al Shibh was then subjected to torture techniques for an estimated 34 days straight.  When the interrogators cabled CIA headquarters that they did not believe Bin al Shibh had the information it sought, superiors told them to keep going, and so they did, for another three weeks.

The Bin al Shibh torture plan became the “template.” Six more detainees would be subjected to similar treatment before meeting with interrogators under similar “plans” approved by Langley. These plans typically didn’t specify what information the CIA thought the victim had. In short, despite the CIA’s assertion that its methods were necessary because its prisoners were withholding information – which wouldn’t justify its crimes anyway – actual withholding was clearly not a prerequisite for torture.

The report also reveals that over and over, with victim after victim, CIA headquarters told interrogators to keep going even when the interrogators assessed that the prisoner did not have the information the CIA sought, was “cooperating,” or might be permanently psychologically damaged.

This happened repeatedly with Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri, who was rendered by the CIA in November, 2002 to the “Salt Pit” prison in Afghanistan, then to Thailand (where he was waterboarded three times), and then on to Poland in December, 2002.

After al-Nashiri arrived in Poland, interrogators cabled headquarters that al-Nashiri was not “withholding important threat information” and that if the CIA’s methods were resumed he might “suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute.” 

Langley responded by sending an untrained interrogator to Poland who shackled Nashiri with “his hands affixed over his head” for 2 1/2 days, and threatened him by holding a gun near his head as well as by operating a power drill next to his body while he was blindfolded.

Then, in January, 2003, one of the CIA’s two torture-touting contract psychologists was sent out to Poland. “Dunbar,” code for Bruce Jessen, recommended another course of torture techniques – which headquarters approved – even after the chief interrogator warned that “continued enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically.”

Al-Nashiri would be held in Poland until June 2003 before being transferred to five more CIA prisons. On July 24, 2014, the European Court of Human Rights found that Poland was complicit in the CIA’s torture of al-Nashiri.

The report also details torture and secret detention seemingly unconnected to any intelligence purpose at all. The situation at the Salt Pit is emblematic, the prison where Gul Rahman was tortured to death in November 2002.

Prisoners at the Salt Pit were kept in the dark for 24 hours a day, in cells without heat in winter, with buckets for toilets. Senate staff found a photo of a “well-worn waterboard” at the Salt Pit, although the CIA has not admitted to waterboarding anyone there. The CIA could not explain the presence of the waterboard to Senate staff.

More than a year after Rahman’s death, CIA officials on the ground and back at headquarters knew shockingly little about who the CIA held in Afghanistan and why. In December 2003, an official would cable CIA headquarters:

“[W]e have made the unsettling discovery that we are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country _] have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year . . . . In a few cases, there does not appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact the case, the detainees should be released”.

To this day, the CIA can’t account for everyone held at the Salt Pit. Their stories remain unknown.

We don’t know who at CIA headquarters approved the torture plans and told the interrogators to keep torturing, because their names are redacted in the report. A special prosecutor, however, should be able to figure it out.

© 2014, American Civil Liberties Union
Originally posted by the ACLU at aclu.org/blog/human-rights-national-security/what-did-cias-torture-program-have-do-intelligence-gathering-not

Read more:

The American Civil Liberties Union is championing five recommendations it says would “help ensure that the United States never tortures again.”
https://www.aclu.org/accountability-torture

One of the five remedies would honour Americans who opposed the use of torture:
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/acts-courage-against-torture

And:
More of artist Dmitry Borshch’s grotesques are here:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/borshch/

 

 

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CIA psychologists failed both scientific rigour and morality

By Laurence Alison, University of Liverpool
December 10, 2014

During the War on Terror, the CIA’s operations subjected hundreds of suspected terrorists to harsh interrogation techniques, which were often criticised as constituting torture. Now, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the operation has made it clearer than ever that the CIA used many forms of “enhanced interrogation” to elicit information – very harsh methods indeed that simply did not yield the intended results.

American soldiers Charles Graner and Lynndie England posing with prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Grander and Lynndie were later court-martialled, and given jail terms. Photo via Wikipedia by U.S. military, public domain

Torture of prisoners by the CIA “is a matter of outrage for everyone, but as psychologists, we have a particular obligation to speak out,” writes Laurence Alison. Psychologists helped the CIA develop techniques of deprivation, humiliation, threats and repeated water boarding. Above, American soldiers Charles Graner and Lynndie England posing with prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Grander and Lynndie were later court-martialled, and given jail terms. Photo via Wikipedia by U.S. military, public domain

As a leaked State Department memo put it, the report “tells a story of which no American is proud”.

This is a matter of outrage for everyone, but as psychologists, we have a particular obligation to speak out. Many of the approaches the CIA used were developed by our discipline, and by individuals who will have known about the codes of conduct by which US psychologists are bound – which include beneficence and non-maleficence, and respect for rights, dignity and integrity.

It is profoundly disturbing to see that the CIA’s techniques included deprivation of basic needs (warmth, food, water), humiliation, threats and the repeated use of waterboarding.

Ironically, many of the methods adopted were based on psychologists’ previous work directed at training members of the military, intended to assist them in avoiding talking to interrogators should they be captured and tortured. This work was apparently reverse-engineered for use on terrorist suspects.

Although these techniques have been given the newspeakish euphemism “enhanced interrogation”, they are consciously meant as a powerful assault on the basic conditions necessary for mental survival, specifically by overloading the subject’s homeostatic system.

Homeostasis is the body’s ability to adjust in response to external changes in order to maintain a stable internal equilibrium. The objective of an extreme assault on a human system is to stop the individual from adjusting in time, or at all.

For example, we are built to respond to various complex stimuli throughout the course of any given day, and when the arousal system is subjected to severe sensory deprivation over long periods, it seeks to readjust.

If the deprivation is intense and persistent, the arousal system seeks to fill the gap. And in the process, it can fill the void created with psychotic symptoms: hallucinations, paranoia, hearing voices and a loss of a sense of a cohesive or continuous sense of self.

Several other methods are directed at overload rather than deprivation, such as threats, “feral treatment” (treating people like animals), pharmacological manipulation, and humiliation. These can induce similar psychological effects, and may result in severe short, medium and even long-term symptoms, including loss of memory and a damaged ability to learn, reason or make decisions.

In fact, such techniques can damage brain structures such as the hippocampus (one of the first regions to suffer in Alzheimer’s disease) and lead to the loss of brain mass by inhibiting the regeneration of brain cells.

So both from an ethical standpoint and going on the evidence of myriad studies of trauma, enhanced interrogations are both unlikely to work and manifestly objectionable. The psychologists involved in this work should clearly have known it was an incredibly dangerous path to tread.

If you really want to stage an effective interrogation, the literature points in entirely the opposite direction – and so does orthodox law enforcement practice.

In the US (as in many other countries), rapport is considered a vital part of police interrogation. Psychological research has long shown that building rapport with witnesses increases the amount of accurate information generated. We know that rapport enhances cooperation during interviews, and elicits more accurate information.

In our own work, based on hundreds of hours of observation of field interviews, we found that interrogators that used approaches more akin to methods used in therapy were more effective at both decreasing detainee disengagement (including “no comment” interviews) and eliciting useful information and evidence.

We found that where non-judgemental acceptance, empathy and autonomy were present, alongside the ability to fluidly adapt to the detainee’s topics and shifts in what they were prepared to talk about (or not talk about), reflective listening and attentiveness were by far the most successful approach.

In fact, interrogators who resisted the (perhaps natural) urge to try and change or challenge the detainee’s behaviours and beliefs engaged more with their suspects and got more information from them.

Our work on rapport is nothing new. More than 200 clinical trials, efficacy reviews, and meta-analyses have found more humane approaches to be effective in the treatment of a range of health problems once treated with harsh and coercive methods – issues as diverse as chronic mental disorder, cardiovascular rehabilitation, problem gambling, and substance use disorders.

In all those arenas, the original notion was that the “problem” needed to be dealt with through rational/persuasive and manipulative means that might persuade, coerce or control individuals “out” of their errant, criminal and destructive ways – essentially to bully them into compliance.

So a fundamental point stands: despite the ethical sanctions, the evidence is that enhanced interrogations just don’t work, and that rapport-based methods do.

It remains to be seen exactly why psychologists working today might have advocated, designed or implemented the methods described in the Senate report, but there can be no doubt that their complicity is a failure of both scientific rigour and morality. As the committee’s findings are picked over, and the political back-and-forth over them gets underway, this must not be forgotten.

The ConversationCreative Commons

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Related work on F&O:

Verbatim: Senate report — CIA torture, misleading, and mismanagement , by F&O

Laurence Alison is the Director of the Centre for Critical and Major Incident Psychology at University of Liverpool.  Alison receives funding from the University of Texas El Paso subcontracted work of the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group , with the UTEP work under the direction of Dr Chris Meissner. The reviewer of this article, Michael Humann, is Training Director, Centre for Critical and Major Incident Psychology Research at University of Liverpool. He does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

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Report released on CIA torture

Iconic image of Ali Shallal al-Qaisi being tortured in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq

The infamous image of Ali Shallal al-Qaisi being tortured in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq

Stark findings of torture and of the CIA misleading officials and the public are among the conclusions of a report released today by the outgoing Democrats on the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

As part of our Verbatim series, F&O provides a brief overview, selected excerpts, and links to the original report and other documents. An excerpt of Senate report on CIA torture, misleading, and mismanagement

From 2002 to 2007, America’s Central Intelligence Agency tortured prisoners to no avail; misled elected officials, journalists and the public; kept prisoners in conditions that led to their deaths, and “damaged the United States’ standing in the world.”

None of these allegations are new. Never before, though, have they come from the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which Tuesday released a set of official conclusions that can only be called damning.

The CIA acted in the context of the 9/11 terror attacks on the country, acknowledged committee chair Dianne Feinstein in her forward to the summary of the long-awaited report. But the context should not serve as an excuse, she said, “rather as a warning for the future   … continue reading Verbatim: Senate report on CIA torture, misleading, and mismanagement. 

 

If you value our journalism, please help sustain us by buying a day pass or subscription. Facts and Opinions is an online journal of first-rate reporting and analysis, in words and images: choice journalism, without borders. Independent, non-partisan and employee-owned, F&O performs journalism for citizens, funded entirely by readers. We do not carry advertising or solicit donations from foundations or causes.

Click here to purchase a $1 day pass or subscription, from $2.95 per month to $19.95 annually. Subscribe by email using the form on the right to our free FRONTLINES blog. Find news in REPORTS; commentary, analysis, magazine and arts writing in OPINION/FEATURES, and image galleries in PHOTO-ESSAYS.  Follow us on Facebook and Twitter, and check our Contents page for regular updates.

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Verbatim: U.S. senators condemn CIA detention, interrorgation activities

 

 December, 2014

 

For six years after the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States, the country’s Central Intelligence Agency tortured prisoners;  misled American leaders and the American public; kept prisoners in conditions that led to their deaths, and “damaged the United States’ standing in the world.”

This iconic image of Ali Shallal al-Qaisi being tortured in Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, eventually commanded the cover of the Economist magazine.

This iconic image of Ali Shallal al-Qaisi being tortured in Abu Ghraib prison, in Iraq, eventually commanded the cover of the Economist magazine.

None of these allegations are new. Never before, though, have they come from American law-makers.

The U.S. Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, on Dec. 9,  released a set of official conclusions about CIA activities after the terror attacks that can only be called damning.

“It is my personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured,” said the committee’s chair, Dianne Feinstein, Dem-Calif. “I also believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.”

 The report was approved by the Senate committee in 2012. It was declassified and released by Democrats on the committee in what is effectively their 11th hour — Democrats will soon lose control of the the committee to Republicans. All but one of the Republicans on the committee, as well as former CIA and other officials, had objected to both the committee’s approval of the report in 2012, and to its release.

For the history of the report, we recommend ProPublica’s Timeline: The Tortured History of the Senate’s Torture Report.

Selected excerpts: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

#1: The CIA’s use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

#2: The CIA’s justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.

The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the department of justice, the CIA Office of  [the] Inspector General,Congress and the public that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots “thwarted” and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but also necessary to acquire “otherwise unavailable” actionable intelligence that “saved lives.”

The committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects.

U.S. Senatore Diane Feinstein in 2011. Official photo

U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein, Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Official 2011 photo

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.

Beginning with the CIA’s first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and “wallings” (slamming detainees against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an “an open, non- threatening approach,”^ or that interrogations began with the “least coercive technique possible”^ and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became “completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, fullmouth.'”^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammadas evolving into a “series of near drownings.”^

Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.

Contrary to CIA representations . . . , the CIA instructed personnel that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take “precedence” over his medical care,^ resulting in the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep deprivation.

At least five CIA detainees were subjected to “rectal rehydration” or rectal feeding without documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water “baths.” The CIA led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting to one . . . that he only leave in a coffin-shapedbox.^ . . . CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families — [including] threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to “cut [a detainee’s] mother’s throat.”

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policy-makers and others.

Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. CIA detainees at [one] facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. . . .

At times, the detainees at [this facility] were walked around naked or were shackled with their hands above their heads for extended periods . . . . Other times, the detainees . . . were subjected to what was described as a “rough takedown,” in which approximately five CIA officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with . . . tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and punched.

Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel. . . .

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the department of justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program.

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.

#8: The CIA’s operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other presidential agencies.

#9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA’s Office of [the] Inspector General.

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

CIA director John Brennan, appointed long after the events, responded to the report by saying efforts by the agency and other American and foreign agencies’ prevented terrorist attacks, maintaining “countless lives have been saved and our Homeland is more secure.”</p>

John O. Brennan, Director, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

John O. Brennan, Director, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Official photo

As part of the CIA’s global effort to dismantle al-Qa’ida and to prevent future terrorist attacks, the agency was directed by President Bush six days after 9/11 to carry out a program to detain terrorist suspects around the world. Certain detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, which the department of uustice determined at the time to be lawful and which were duly authorized by the Bush administration. These techniques, which were last used by the CIA in December 2007, subsequently were prohibited by an Executive Order issued by President Obama when he took office in January 2009.

We acknowledge that the detention and interrogation program had shortcomings and that the agency made mistakes. The most serious problems occurred early on and stemmed from the fact that the Agency was unprepared and lacked the core competencies required to carry out an unprecedented, worldwide program of detaining and interrogating suspected . . . terrorists. In carrying out that program, we did not always live up to the high standards that we set for ourselves and that the American people expect of us. As an agency, we have learned from these mistakes, which is why my predecessors and I have implemented various remedial measures over the years to address institutional deficiencies.

. . . we part ways with the [Senate]  committee on some key points. Our review indicates that [enhanced interrogation techniques]. . . did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists and save lives. . . .

We also disagree with the Study’s characterization of how CIA briefed the program to Congress, various entities within the executive branch and the public. While we made mistakes, the record does not support the study’s inference that the agency systematically and intentionally misled each of these audiences on the effectiveness of the program. . . .

Amnesty International described the Senate report as “a stark reminder of the ongoing impunity for the many appalling human rights violations perpetrated in the name of ‘national
security.’ “

The [summary] provides more details of how the Central Intelligence Agency resorted to “waterboarding”, mock execution, sexual threats and other forms of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against detainees who had been forcibly disappeared. The acts were carried out during the rendition and secret detention programs that followed the crime against humanity committed on 11 September 2001 (9/11).

The summary report also provides some information of the effects of the interrogation techniques and detention conditions on the detainees themselves, including “hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation”.

“This report provides yet more damning detail of some of the human rights violations that were authorized by the highest authorities in the USA after 9/11. Despite much evidence having been in the public realm for years, no one has been brought to justice for authorizing or carrying out the acts in these CIA programmes,” said Erika Guevara Rosas, Americas Director Amnesty International.

Limited US Department of Justice investigations into CIA interrogations were ended in 2012 without anyone being charged. Likewise the CIA’s destruction of videotapes of interrogation sessions – containing possible evidence of crimes under international law – did not result in any charges.

Access to justice for those who endured abuses has been systematically blocked by US authorities, including on the grounds of state secrecy….

Excerpts of statement by Republican Senator John McCain:

Mr. President, I rise in support of the release – the long-delayed release – of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s summarized, unclassified review of the so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ that were employed by the previous administration to extract information from captured terrorists. It is a thorough and thoughtful study of practices that I believe not only failed their purpose – to secure actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the U.S. and our allies – but actually damaged our security interests, as well as our reputation as a force for good in the world.

“I believe the American people have a right – indeed, a responsibility – to know what was done in their name; how these practices did or did not serve our interests; and how they comported with our most important values.

“I commend Chairman Feinstein and her staff for their diligence in seeking a truthful accounting of policies I hope we will never resort to again. I thank them for persevering against persistent opposition from many members of the intelligence community, from officials in two administrations, and from some of our colleagues.

“The truth is sometimes a hard pill to swallow. It sometimes causes us difficulties at home and abroad. It is sometimes used by our enemies in attempts to hurt us. But the American people are entitled to it, nonetheless.

“They must know when the values that define our nation are intentionally disregarded by our security policies, even those policies that are conducted in secret. They must be able to make informed judgments about whether those policies and the personnel who supported them were justified in compromising our values; whether they served a greater good; or whether, as I believe, they stained our national honor, did much harm and little practical good.

“What were the policies? What was their purpose? Did they achieve it? Did they make us safer? Less safe? Or did they make no difference? What did they gain us? What did they cost us? The American people need the answers to these questions. Yes, some things must be kept from public disclosure to protect clandestine operations, sources and methods, but not the answers to these questions….

“I have long believed some of these practices amounted to torture, as a reasonable person would define it, especially, but not only the practice of waterboarding, which is a mock execution and an exquisite form of torture. Its use was shameful and unnecessary; and, contrary to assertions made by some of its defenders and as the Committee’s report makes clear, it produced little useful intelligence to help us track down the perpetrators of 9/11 or prevent new attacks and atrocities.

“I know from personal experience that the abuse of prisoners will produce more bad than good intelligence. I know that victims of torture will offer intentionally misleading information if they think their captors will believe it. I know they will say whatever they think their torturers want them to say if they believe it will stop their suffering. Most of all, I know the use of torture compromises that which most distinguishes us from our enemies, our belief that all people, even captured enemies, possess basic human rights, which are protected by international conventions the U.S. not only joined, but for the most part authored….

References and further reading:

The Senate report has been removed from the intelligence committee site, but its contents are discussed on the Stanford Library site: http://library.stanford.edu/blogs/stanford-libraries-blog/2014/12/official-senate-cia-torture-report (updated Dec. 2015)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, summary.

CIA redacted response to the Senate study, June, 2013, redacted, and released Dec. 9: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/index.html

CIA Fact Sheet response to the Senate study: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2014-press-releases-statements/cia-fact-sheet-ssci-study-on-detention-interrogation-program.html

Amnesty International press release: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/usa-senate-summary-report-cia-detention-programme-must-not-be-end-story-2014-12-09

Senator John McCain’s floor statement in support of the report and its release.

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Click here to purchase a $1 day pass or subscription, from $2.95 per month to $19.95 annually. Subscribe by email using the form on the right to our free FRONTLINES blog. Find news in REPORTS; commentary, analysis, magazine and arts writing in OPINION/FEATURES, and image galleries in PHOTO-ESSAYS.  Follow us on Facebook and Twitter, and check our Contents page for regular updates.

 

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Why Spy Scandal Stokes German Distrust of U.S.

Angela Merkel. Official photo by Armin Linnartz, Creative Commons

Angela Merkel. Armin Linnartz, Creative Commons

“Spy versus spy games are one thing, but spying on the work of a parliamentary committee of one of Washington’s closest allies is worse than stupid. It is very rude,” writes International Affairs analyst Jonathan Manthorpe, pondering the scandal which prompted Germany to ask America’s CIA’s station chief to leave. The incident stoked the “smouldering debate in Germany about the future nature of its alliance with Washington,” he warned in today’s column. An excerpt:

American spy agencies in particular seem unable to make the distinction between what they can do and what they should do or, more precisely, what they should not do. President Barrack Obama has pledged to reform the entire U.S. intelligence establishment, but going on some recent events, the agencies still seem to be operating on cruise control. They continue to gather up whatever information is obtainable without questioning the means involved or the likely value of the product. 

The current breech of fraternal relations between the U.S. and Germany is a context in point. Last year’s leak of NSA material by Snowden included information that the electronic surveillance organization had been bugging the cell phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Late last month, German outrage got another jolt when it was found that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been buying secret documents from an employee of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst. If that was not enough, on Wednesday, Germany’s Federal Criminal Police raided the home of a Defence Ministry employee, who is also suspected of spying for Washington. If true, this allegation is particularly heinous and embarrassing for Washington because it seems the CIA was buying copies of secret documents being prepared for a parliamentary committee investigating the implications of the Snowden revelations … read more (subscription*)

Log in on the top right of each page (or click here to purchase a subscription or a $1 site day pass) to read:

Spy scandal confirms Germans’ growing mistrust of Washington

Jonathan Manthorpe’s columnist page is here.

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